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Abstract
This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of values and solutions for two-person
zero-sum one-step games with possibly noncompact action sets for both players and possibly unbounded
payoff functions, which may be neither convex nor concave. For such games payoffs may not be defined
for some pairs of strategies. In addition to the existence of values and solutions, this paper investigates
continuity properties of the value functions and solution multifunctions for families of games with pos-
sibly noncompact action sets and unbounded payoff functions, when action sets and payoffs depend on
a parameter.
1 Introduction
This paper studies two-person zero-sum one-step games with possibly unbounded payoff functions, which
may be neither convex nor concave, and with possibly noncompact action sets for both players. For such
problems, the outcome of the game may be uncertain for some pairs of strategies because the corresponding
expectations may not be well-defined; see (1.1). In addition, the standard minimax and infsup equalities
and inequalities cannot be written because their both sides may be uncertain. In this paper, we introduce the
values and solutions for such games, prove sufficient conditions for their existence, and establish continuity
properties of the values and solution multifunctions if action sets and payoffs depend on a parameter.
Let us consider a game with action sets A and B for Players I and II respectively and with a payoff
function c : A × B 7→ R, where c(a, b) is the payoff from Player I to Player II. We assume that A and B
are standard Borel spaces and c(a, b) is a Borel function. Since some of the results of this paper deal with
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Tcontinuity properties of payoff functions and solutions, we assume without loss of generality that A and Bare Borel subsets of Polish (complete, separable metric) spaces.The sets of strategies for Players I and II are the sets P(A) and P(B) of probability measures on A andB respectively. If Player I chooses a strategy piA ∈ P(A) and Player II chooses a strategy piB ∈ P(B), thenPlayer I pays Player II the amountcˆ(piA, piB) = ∫A×B c(a, b)piA(da)piB(b), (1.1)which may not be defined since the function c can be bounded neither from below nor from above. Though,
as explained below, the standard definitions of values are not suitable for such games, the natural definition
of the value follows form the definition of a Nash equilibrium.
The classic lower value supπB ∈P(B) infπA ∈P(A) cˆ(pi
A, piB) of the game and the classic upper value
infπA∈P(A) supπB∈P(B) cˆ(pi
A, piB) of the game cannot be defined because cˆ(piA, piB) may not be defined for
some pairs (piA, piB) ∈ P(A) × P(B). In this paper we assume natural conditions on the payoff function c,
under which the payoffs are defined when either piA or piB is a pure strategy (in other words, when at least one
player acts deterministically); see Definition 2.3 (iv, v). In this case, the values supπB∈P(B) infa∈A cˆ(a, pi
B)
and infπA∈P(A) supb∈B cˆ(pi
A, b) are well-defined, where with a slight abuse of notations we sometimes write
a and b in various functions instead of Dirac measures δ{a} and δ{b} concentrated at a ∈ A and at b ∈ B
respectively. In addition, these values are equal to the lower and upper values of the game in the classic
situation, when cˆ(piA, piB) is well-defined for each pair (piA, piB) ∈ P(A) × P(B). However, if cˆ(piA, piB)
can be uncertain for some pairs (piA, piB) ∈ P(A) × P(B), these expressions are not natural for definitions
of lower and upper values because in general it is not clear whether the lower value is not greater than the
upper value if the values are defined this way.
When some of the payoffs cˆ(piA, piB) can be uncertain, the concepts of values, solutions and the structure
of the corresponding infsup equations become clear from the definition of a Nash equilibrium for this game.
A pair of strategies (piA∗ , pi
B
∗ ) of Players I and II form a Nash equilibrium, if cˆ(pi
A
∗ , pi
B) and cˆ(piA, piB∗ ) are
well defined for all piA ∈ P(A), piB ∈ P(B) and
cˆ(piA∗ , pi
B) ≤ cˆ(piA∗ , pi
B
∗ ) ≤ cˆ(pi
A, piB∗ ). (1.2)
We denote by PS(A) ⊂ P(A) (and by PS(B) ⊂ P(B)) the sets of strategies such that cˆ(piA, piB) is well
defined for all piB ∈ P(B) if piA ∈ PS(A) (cˆ(piA, piB) is well defined for all piA ∈ P(A) if piB ∈ PS(B)). The
strategies from these sets are called safe. They are safe in the sense that, if a player chooses such a strategy,
the payoff can be calculated for every response of the opponent. In particular, pure strategies are safe under
the natural assumptions stated in Definition 2.3 (iv, v).
Thus, a pair of strategies (piA∗ , pi
B
∗ ) can form the Nash equilibrium even if the integrals cˆ(pi
A, piB) are not
defined for some pairs (piA, piB) ∈ P(A) × P(B). The lower and upper values corresponding to the Nash
equilibrium solutions for this zero-sum game are
v♭ := sup
πB∈PS(B)
inf
πA∈PS(A)
cˆ(piA, piB) and v♯ := inf
πA∈PS(A)
sup
πB∈PS(B)
cˆ(piA, piB).
If v♭ = v♯, then v := v♭ = v♯ is called the value. Observe that, if the integral in (1.1) is defined for all
(piA, piB) ∈ P(A)× P(B), then the introduced definition of the value coincides with the classic definition of
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Tthe value because PS(A) = P(A) and PS(B) = P(B) in the classic sense. Thus, the introduced definitionof the values is more general than the classic definition.Section 2 of this paper introduces the basic definitions and establishes some relations. Section 3 providessufficient conditions for the existence of the value. Section 4 provides sufficient conditions for the existenceof solutions for the game. Section 5 provides examples of games with and without solutions. Section 6describes continuity properties of the values and solution multifunctions. Appendix A presents results onthe properties K-inf-compact functions (this is a natural class of functions, introduced in [8] and studied in[5, 6, 9, 10], for which Berge’s maximum theorem holds for metric spaces and possibly noncompact action
sets), and Appendix B describes continuity properties of minimax operators used in the proofs in this paper.
Our initial motivation for studying games with unbounded payoffs in Feinberg et al. [10] and in this
paper was originated by the progress in the theory of Markov Decision Processes with possibly noncompact
action sets and unbounded costs [4, 7, 9, 11], that led to the extension of Berge’s maximum theorem to
possibly noncompact action sets; see Feinberg et al. [6, 8], Feinberg and Kasyanov [5].
These results were applied in [10] to games with perfect information. In this case, only pure strategies
can be used and uncertainties can be avoided. Games with simultaneous moves are also studied in [10],
but only for the situations when uncertainties can be avoided: (i) the upper and lower values are defined
asymmetrically, or (ii) the payoff function is bounded below or above, and this assumption under natural
continuity conditions implies that one of the action sets is compact.
The classic results on the existence of values with possibly noncompact action sets also avoid the situ-
ations when the outcomes can be uncertain. These results include Mertens et al. [16, Proposition I.1.9], in
which A is a compact topological space, B is an arbitrary set, the one-step payoff function c(a, b) is lower
semi-continuous in a, and the upper and lower values are defined asymmetrically, and Aubin and Eke-
land [2, Theorem 6.2.7] that deals with a convex-concave payoff function and pure strategies; see Perchet
and Vigeral [18] for a related result when A is finite dimensional.
For standard Borel action spaces A and B this paper studies models, when both action sets may be non-
compact and payoff functions may be neither convex nor concave. These models have significant potential
applications to stochastic games; see Jas´hkewicz and Nowak [13, 14], Mertens et al. [16, Chapter VII], and
references therein for the literature on stochastic games.
2 Definitions and Preliminary Results
LetR := R∪{±∞} and S be a metric space. For a nonempty set S ⊂ S, the notation f : S ⊂ S 7→ Rmeans
that for each s ∈ S the value f(s) ∈ R is defined. In general, the function f may be also defined outside
of S. The notation f : S 7→ R means that the function f is defined on the entire space S. This notation is
equivalent to the notation f : S ⊂ S 7→ R, which we do not write explicitly. For a function f : S ⊂ S 7→ R
we sometimes consider its restriction f
∣∣
S˜
: S˜ ⊂ S 7→ R to the set S˜ ⊂ S. Throughout the paper we denote
by K(S) the family of all nonempty compact subsets of S and by S(S) the family of all nonempty subsets
of S.
We recall that, for a nonempty set S ⊂ S, a function f : S ⊂ S 7→ R is called lower semi-
continuous at s ∈ S, if for each sequence {s(n)}n=1,2,... ⊂ S, that converges to s in S, the inequality
3
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Tlim infn→∞ f(s(n)) ≥ f(s) holds. A function f : S ⊂ S 7→ R is called upper semi-continuous at s ∈ S, if−f is lower semi-continuous at s ∈ S. Consider the level setsDf (λ;S) := {s ∈ S : f(s) ≤ λ}, λ ∈ R.The level sets Df (λ;S) satisfy the following properties that are used in this paper:(a) if λ1 > λ, then Df (λ;S) ⊂ Df (λ1;S);(b) if g, f are functions on S satisfying g(s) ≥ f(s) for all s ∈ S then Dg(λ;S) ⊂ Df (λ;S).A function f : S ⊂ S 7→ R is called lower / upper semi-continuous, if f is lower / upper semi-continuous
at each s ∈ S. A function f : S ⊂ S 7→ R is called inf-compact on S, if all the level sets {Df (λ;S)}λ∈R
are compact in S. A function f : S ⊂ S 7→ R is called sup-compact on S if −f is inf-compact on S.
Each nonempty subset S of a metric space S can be considered as a metric space with the same metric.
Then K(S) is the family of all nonempty compact subsets of the metric space S.
Remark 2.1. For each nonempty subset S ⊂ S the following equality holds:
K(S) = {C ⊂ S : C ∈ K(S)}.
Remark 2.2. It is well-known that a function f : S 7→ R is lower semi-continuous if and only if the set
Df (λ;S) is closed for every λ ∈ R; see e.g., Aubin [1, p. 12, Proposition 1.4]. For a function f : S ⊂ S 7→
R, let f˜ be the function f˜ : S 7→ R, defined as f˜(s) := f(s), when s ∈ S, and f˜(s) := +∞ otherwise.
Then the function f˜ : S 7→ R is lower semi-continuous if and only if for each λ ∈ R the set Df (λ;S) is
closed in S. This is true since Df˜ (λ;S)=Df (λ;S) for all λ ∈ R.
For a metric space S, let B(S) be the Borel σ-field on S, that is, the σ-field is generated by all open sets
of the metric space S. For a nonempty Borel subset S ⊂ S, denote by B(S) the σ-field whose elements are
intersections of S with elements of B(S). Observe that S is a metric space with the same metric as on S,
and B(S) is its Borel σ-field. For a metric space S, let P(S) be the set of probability measures on (S,B(S)).
For an arbitrary set S, let Pfs(S) be the set of all probability measures whose supports are finite subsets of
S. A sequence of probability measures {µ(n)}n=1,2,... from P(S) converges weakly to µ ∈ P(S) if for each
bounded continuous function f on S
∫
S
f(s)µ(n)(ds)→
∫
S
f(s)µ(ds) as n→∞.
We endow P(S) with the topology of the weak convergence of probability measures on S. If S is a separable
metric space, then P(S) is separable metric space too and the set Pfs(S) is dense in P(S); Parthasarathy [17,
Chapter II, Theorems 6.2 and 6.3].
An integral
∫
S
f(s)µ(ds) of a measurable R-valued function f on S over the measure µ ∈ P(S) is well-
defined if either
∫
S
f−(s)µ(ds) > −∞ or
∫
S
f+(s)µ(ds) < +∞, where f−(s) = min{f(s), 0}, f+(s) =
max{f(s), 0}, s ∈ S. If the integral is well-defined, then
∫
S
f(s)µ(ds) :=
∫
S
f+(s)µ(ds)+
∫
S
f−(s)µ(ds).
Definition 2.3. A two-person zero-sum game is a triplet {A,B, c}, where
(i) A is the space of actions for Player I, which is a nonempty Borel subset of a Polish space;
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T(ii) B is the space of actions for Player II, which is a nonempty Borel subset of a Polish space;(iii) the payoff from Player I to Player II, −∞ < c(a, b) < +∞, for choosing actions a ∈ A and b ∈ B,is a measurable function on A× B;(iv) for each b ∈ B the function a 7→ c(a, b) is bounded from below on A;(v) for each a ∈ A the function b 7→ c(a, b) is bounded from above on B.The game is played as follows:
• a decision-makers (Players I and II) choose simultaneously respective actions a ∈ A and b ∈ B;
• the result (a, b) is announced to both of them;
• Player I pays Player II the amount c(a, b).
Strategies (sometimes called “mixed strategies”) for Players I and II are probability measures piA ∈ P(A)
and piB ∈ P(B) respectively. Moreover, piA (piB) is called pure if the probability measure piA( · ) (piB( · )) is
concentrated at one point. Note that P(A) is the set of strategies for Player I, and P(B) is the set of strategies
for Player II.
Remark 2.4. If a triplet {A,B, c} is the two-person zero-sum game defined above, then the triplet {B,A,−cA↔B},
where cA↔B(b, a) := c(a, b) for each a ∈ A and b ∈ B, is also a game satisfying conditions (i–v) from Def-
inition 2.3.
Remark 2.5. Assumptions (iv) and (v) for the game {A,B, c} are natural because without them the expected
payoffs can be undefined even if one of the players chooses a pure strategy.
Let us set
cˆ⊕(piA, piB) :=
∫
A
∫
B
c+(a, b)piB(db)piA(da), cˆ⊖(piA, piB) :=
∫
A
∫
B
c−(a, b)piB(db)piA(da),
for each (piA, piB) ∈ P(A)× P(B). Then the expected payoff from Player I to Player II is
cˆ(piA, piB) := cˆ⊕(piA, piB) + cˆ⊖(piA, piB), (2.1)
and it is well-defined, if either cˆ⊕(piA, piB) < +∞ or cˆ⊖(piA, piB) > −∞, where (piA, piB) ∈ P(A)× P(B).
Of course, when the function c is unbounded both below as well as above, the quantity cˆ(piA, piB) is possibly
undefined for some (piA, piB) ∈ P(A)× P(B).We denote:
P
S
πA(B) := {pi
B ∈ P(B) : cˆ(piA, piB) is well-defined}, piA ∈ P(A);
P
S
πB(A) := {pi
A ∈ P(A) : cˆ(piA, piB) is well-defined}, piB ∈ P(B).
With a slight abuse of notations, we shall write cˆ(a, piB) and cˆ(piA, b) instead of cˆ(δ{a}, pi
B) and cˆ(piA, δ{b})
for each piA ∈ P(A) and piB ∈ P(B), where δ{a} and δ{b} are Dirac measures concentrated at a ∈ A and at
b ∈ B respectively.
Remark 2.6. Assumption (iv) for the game {A,B, c} yields that cˆ⊖(piA, b) > −∞ for each piA ∈ P(A)
and b ∈ B. Therefore, Pfs(B) ⊂ PS
πA
(B) for each piA ∈ P(A) and, since Pfs(B) is dense in P(B), then
∩πA∈P(A)P
S
πA
(B) is dense in P(B).
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TRemark 2.7. Assumption (v) for the game {A,B, c} implies that cˆ⊕(a, piB) < +∞ for each a ∈ A andpiB ∈ P(B). Thus, Pfs(A) ⊂ PSπB(A) for each piB ∈ P(B) and, since Pfs(A) is dense in P(A), then∩πB∈P(B)PSπB(A) is dense in P(A).The set of strategies for each player is partitioned into the sets of safe strategies PS(A) and PS(B)(strategies, for which the expected payoff is well-defined for all strategies played by another player) andunsafe strategies PU(A) and PU (B):PS(A) := {piA ∈ P(A) : PSπA(B) = P(B)}, PU (A) := {piA ∈ P(A) : PSπA(B) 6= P(B)};
P
S(B) := {piB ∈ P(B) : PSπB(A) = P(A)}, P
U (B) := {piB ∈ P(B) : PSπB(A) 6= P(A)}.
Remark 2.8. We note that P(A) = PS(A) ∪ PU(A), P(B) = PS(B) ∪ PU(B), PS(A) ∩ PU (A) = ∅, and
P
S(B)∩PU(B) = ∅.Moreover, Pfs(A) ⊂ PS(A) (see Assumption (iv) from Definition 2.3 and Remark 2.6)
and Pfs(B) ⊂ PS(B) (see Assumption (v) from Definition 2.3 and Remark 2.7). Therefore, PS(A) is dense
in P(A) and PS(B) is dense in P(B).
Let us introduce the following notations:
cˆ♯(piA) := sup
b∈B
cˆ(piA, b), P♯α(A) := {piA∗ ∈ P(A) : cˆ
♯(piA∗ ) ≤ α}, pi
A ∈ P(A), α ∈ R,
cˆ♭(piB) := inf
a∈A
cˆ(a, piB), P♭α(B) := {pi
B
∗ ∈ P(B) : cˆ
♭(piB∗ ) ≥ α}, pi
B ∈ P(B), α ∈ R.
(2.2)
Remarks 2.6 and 2.7 imply respectively that cˆ♯(piA) > −∞ for all piA ∈ P(A) and cˆ♭(piB) < +∞ for all
piB ∈ P(B).
Theorem 2.9. (Feinberg et al. [10, Theorem 17]) Let {A,B, c} be a two-person zero-sum game introduced
in Definition 2.3 and (piA, piB) ∈ P(A)× P(B). Then the following two equalities hold:
cˆ♯(piA) = sup
πB
∗
∈PS
piA
(B)
cˆ(piA, piB∗ ), (2.3)
cˆ♭(piB) = inf
πA
∗
∈PS
piB
(A)
cˆ(piA∗ , pi
B), (2.4)
where cˆ♯ and cˆ♭ are defined in (2.2).
Remark 2.10. In view of assumptions (iv) and (v) from Definition 2.3, the inequality
cˆ♭(piB) ≤ cˆ♯(piA) (2.5)
holds for each piA ∈ P(A) and piB ∈ P(B) such that cˆ(piA, piB) is well-defined, that is, inequality (2.5) holds,
if piB ∈ P(B) and piA ∈ PS
πB
(A), or equivalently, if piA ∈ P(A) and piB ∈ PS
πA
(B). Indeed, for piA ∈ P(A)
and piB ∈ P(B) such that cˆ(piA, piB) is well-defined, the following relations hold:
cˆ♭(piB) = inf
πA
∗
∈PS
piB
(A)
cˆ(piA∗ , pi
B) ≤ cˆ(piA, piB) ≤ sup
πB
∗
∈PS
piA
(B)
cˆ(piA, piB∗ ) = cˆ
♯(piA).
It is not clear whether inequality (2.5) holds for piA ∈ P(A) and piB ∈ P(B) with cˆ(piA, piB) being undefined.
The following definition introduces the lower and upper values in the slightly more “accurate” formula-
tions than it is usually done when cˆ(piA, piB) are always defined.
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TDefinition 2.11. The quantitiesv♭ := supπB∈PS(B) cˆ♭(piB) and v♯ := infπA∈PS(A) cˆ♯(piA) (2.6)are the lower and upper values of the game {A,B, c} respectively.Remark 2.12. Theorem 2.9 and equalities (2.6) imply thatv♭ = supπB∈PS(B) infπA∈∆(A) cˆ(piA, piB) and v♯ = infπA∈PS(A) supπB∈∆(B) cˆ(piA, piB),
for each ∆(A) ⊂ P(A) and ∆(B) ⊂ P(B) such that the sets ∆(A) and ∆(B) contain all pure strategies for
Player I and II respectively. In particular,
v♭ = sup
πB∈PS(B)
inf
πA∈PS(A)
cˆ(piA, piB) and v♯ = inf
πA∈PS(A)
sup
πB∈PS(B)
cˆ(piA, piB). (2.7)
Formulae (2.7) imply that
v♭ ≤ v♯.
Remark 2.13. If cˆ(piA, piB) is well-defined for each (piA, piB) ∈ P(A) × P(B), as this takes place when c
is bounded from below or above on A × B, then the lower and upper values defined in (2.6) coincide with
their classic definitions, that is,
v♭ = sup
πB∈P(B)
cˆ♭(piB) = sup
πB∈P(B)
inf
πA∈P(A)
cˆ(piA, piB),
v♯ = inf
πA∈P(A)
cˆ♯(piA) = inf
πA∈P(A)
sup
πB∈P(B)
cˆ(piA, piB);
see also Theorem 2.9.
The following definition is consistent with Definition 2.11.
Definition 2.14. If the equality
v♭ = v♯ (2.8)
holds, then we say that this common quantity is the value of the game {A,B, c}. We denote the value by v.
Remark 2.15. Let {A,B, c} be a two-person zero-sum game introduced in Definition 2.3. If the value v of
the game {A,B, c} exists, then the following equalities hold:
v = sup
πB∈P(B)
cˆ♭(piB) = inf
πA∈P(A)
cˆ♯(piA). (2.9)
Indeed,
v♭ = sup
πB∈PS(B)
cˆ♭(piB) ≤ sup
πB∈P(B)
cˆ♭(piB) ≤ inf
πA∈PS(A)
cˆ♯(piA) = v♯, (2.10)
where the equalities follow from the definitions of lower and upper values (2.6), the first inequality follows
from PS(B) ⊂ P(B), and the second inequality follows from inequality (2.5) because cˆ(piA, piB) is well-
defined for each pair (piA, piB) ∈ PS(A)× P(B). Similarly,
v♭ = sup
πB∈PS(B)
cˆ♭(piB) ≤ inf
πA∈P(A)
cˆ♯(piA) ≤ inf
πA∈PS(A)
cˆ♯(piA) = v♯. (2.11)
Therefore, (2.9) follows from (2.10) and (2.11).
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TLet us set P♯<α(A) := {piA ∈ P(A) : cˆ♯(piA) < α}, α ∈ R,P♭>α(B) := {piB ∈ P(B) : cˆ♭(piB) > α}, α ∈ R,where cˆ♯ and cˆ♭ are defined in (2.2). Recall that the sets P♯α(A) and P♭α(B) are also defined in (2.2).Lemma 2.16. (Feinberg et al. [10, Lemma 6]) Let {A,B, c} be a two-person zero-sum game introduced inDefinition 2.3. Then the following statements hold:(a) the function cˆ♯ is convex on P(A);
(b) the function cˆ♭ is concave on P(B);
(c) the sets P
♯
α(A), P
♯
<α(A), P
♭
α(B), and P
♭
>α(B) are convex for all α ∈ R;
3 Existence of the Value
In this section we introduce some auxiliary results and provide sufficient conditions for the existence of the
value. The proof of the existence of the value uses the following lemma, which can be considered as the
corollary from Theorem 3.3 stated below the lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Let {A,B, c} be a two-person zero-sum game introduced in Definition 2.3 satisfy the following
assumptions:
(i) for each b ∈ B the function a 7→ c(a, b) is lower semi-continuous,
(ii) there exists b0 ∈ B such that the function a 7→ c(a, b0) is inf-compact on A,
and
inf
πA∈PS(A)
cˆ♯(piA) ≤ inf
πA∈PU (A)
cˆ♯(piA), (3.1)
then there exists the value v of the game {A,B, c}. Moreover,
sup
πB∈P(B)
cˆ♭(piB) = inf
πA∈P(A)
cˆ♯(piA). (3.2)
Remark 3.2. Observe that (3.1) and (3.2) hold if cˆ♯(piA) = +∞ for all piA ∈ PU(A).
Theorem 3.3. (Feinberg et al. [10, Theorem 18]) Let a two-person zero-sum game {A,B, c} introduced in
Definition 2.3 satisfy assumptions (i) and (ii) from Lemma 3.1. Then
sup
πB∈PS(B)
cˆ♭(piB) = inf
πA∈P(A)
cˆ♯(piA)
and
sup
πB∈PS(B)
cˆ♭(piB) = sup
πB∈Pfs(B)
cˆ♭(piB).
Moreover, the set P
♯
v(A) is a nonempty convex compact subset of P(A).
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TProof of Lemma 3.1. In view of Theorem 3.3,v♭ = infπA∈P(A) cˆ♯(piA).Inequality (3.1) implies infπA∈P(A) cˆ♯(piA) = infπA∈PS(A) cˆ♯(piA) = v♯. Therefore, v♭ = v♯. Equality (3.2)follows from Remark 2.15.Let {A,B, c} be a two-person zero-sum game introduced in Definition 2.3. We shall provide sufficientconditions for the validity of the statement
cˆ♯(piA) = +∞ if piA ∈ PU (A). (3.3)
Statement (3.3) holds if and only if P
♯
α(A) ⊂ PS(A) for each α ∈ R. Statement (3.3) implies inequality
(3.1). Therefore, statement (3.3) and assumptions (i) and (ii) from Lemma 3.1 imply the existence of the
value of the game. However, as is demonstrated in Feinberg et al. [10, Example 3], it is possible that
cˆ♯(piA) < +∞ for some piA ∈ PU(A) even under stronger conditions than assumptions (i) and (ii) of
Lemma 3.1.
If the function c : A× B 7→ R is bounded from below, then the standard definition of the upper value is
inf
πA∈P(A)
sup
πB∈P(B)
cˆ(piA, piB) = inf
πA∈P(A)
cˆ♯(piA). (3.4)
For the general two-person zero-sum game {A,B, c} introduced in Definition 2.3, if (3.3) holds then, ac-
cording to (2.6) and (2.7),
v♯ = inf
πA∈PS(A)
cˆ♯(piA) = min{+∞; inf
πA∈PS(A)
cˆ♯(piA)} = inf
πA∈P(A)
cˆ♯(piA).
Therefore, if (3.3) holds, then v♯ = infπA∈P(A) cˆ
♯(piA), which is one of the equivalent definitions of lower
value when the function c is bounded from below. The similar remark is applicable to the upper value v♭.
Assumptions (iii) and (iv) from Definition 2.3 imply that
−∞ < cˆ♭(b) ≤ c(a, b) ≤ cˆ♯(a) < +∞, (3.5)
for each a ∈ A and b ∈ B, where the first and the last inequalities follow from conditions (iv) and (v) from
Definition 2.3 of the game {A,B, c}.
Consider the following assumptions.
Assumption (MaW). There exist γA ∈ (0, 1), LA > 0, and pi
B
0 ∈ P
S(B) such that for each a ∈ A
−∞ <
∫
B
min{0, cˆ♭(b)}piB0 (db) and − LA + γAcˆ
♯(a) ≤ cˆ⊕(a, piB0 ). (3.6)
Assumption (Ma). There exist γA ∈ (0, 1), LA > 0, and b0 ∈ B such that for each a ∈ A
− LA + γAcˆ
♯(a) ≤ c+(a, b0). (3.7)
Remark 3.4. For a two-person zero-sum game introduced in Definition 2.3, Assumption (Ma) implies
Assumption (MaW) with piB0 = δ{b0} because of (3.5) and cˆ
⊕(a, δ{b0}) = c
+(a, b0) for each a ∈ A.
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TRemark 3.5. Let {A,B, c} be a two-person zero-sum game introduced in Definition 2.3. If c is boundedfrom above on A × B, then Assumption (Ma) holds and, therefore, Assumption (MaW) holds because thefunction cˆ♯ is bounded from above on A and the function c+ takes non-negative values; see also Remark 3.4.Moreover, PS(A) = P(A) and PS(B) = P(B).Remark 3.6. Let {A,B, c} be a two-person zero-sum game introduced in Definition 2.3. If the set A iscompact and the function c is upper semi-continuous, then Assumption (Ma) holds and, therefore, Assump-tion (MaW) holds; see Remark 3.5. Indeed, Berge’s theorem yields that the function cˆ♯ : A 7→ R is uppersemi-continuous (Berge [3, p. 116], Feinberg et al. [6, p. 255], Hu and Papageorgiou [12, p. 83]) and, there-
fore, it is bounded from above on a compact set A, as follows from the Weierstrass extreme value theorem
for upper semi-continuous functions. Then, according to Remark 3.5, Assumption (Ma) holds and, there-
fore, Assumption (MaW) holds; see also Remark 3.4. Moreover, PS(A) = P(A) and PS(B) = P(B) in this
case.
The following example describes a two-person zero-sum game {A,B, c} with noncompact action sets
and unbounded payoffs satisfying Assumption (Ma) and, therefore, in view of Remark 3.4, this game satis-
fies Assumption (MaW).
Example 3.7. Let A = B = R, c(a, b) = a2 − b2, (a, b) ∈ R2. Then the game {A,B, c} satisfies As-
sumption (Ma) and, therefore, it satisfies Assumption (MaW). Indeed, if we consider arbitrary b0 ∈ R,
γA ∈ (0, 1) and set LA := b
2
0, then
−LA + γAcˆ
♯(a) = γAa
2 − b20 ≤ a
2 − b20 = c(a, b0) ≤ c
+(a, b0)
for each a ∈ R because cˆ♯(a) = a2 for each a ∈ R.
The following lemma and its corollary describe sufficient conditions for (3.3).
Lemma 3.8. Let a two-person zero-sum game {A,B, c} described in Definition 2.3 satisfy Assumption (MaW).
Then
γA
∫
A
∫
B
c+(a, b)piB(db)piA(da) ≤ cˆ♯(piA) + LA −
∫
B
min{0, cˆ♭(b)}piB0 (db) (3.8)
for each piA ∈ P(A) and piB ∈ P(B). Furthermore, if piA ∈ P(A) and cˆ♯(piA) < +∞, then piA ∈ PS(A).
Proof. Let us fix arbitrary piA ∈ P(A), piB ∈ P(B) and prove inequality (3.8). Note that
sup
b∈B
c+(a, b) = max{cˆ♯(a), 0} (3.9)
for each a ∈ A. Indeed, if cˆ♯(a) ≤ 0, then c(a, b) ≤ 0 for each b ∈ B. Otherwise, if cˆ♯(a) > 0, then the set
B+(a) := {b ∈ B : c(a, b) > 0} = {b ∈ B : c+(a, b) > 0} is nonempty and
sup
b∈B
c+(a, b) = sup
b∈B+(a)
c+(a, b) = sup
b∈B+(a)
c(a, b) = sup
b∈B
c(a, b) = cˆ♯(a),
which follow from the basic properties of suprema and the definition of B+(a).
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TSince c+(a, b) ≤ supb∗∈B c+(a, b∗) for each a ∈ A and b ∈ B, equality (3.9) implies∫A ∫B c+(a, b)piB(db)piA(da) ≤ ∫Amax{cˆ♯(a), 0}piA(da). (3.10)The second inequality in (3.6) implies thatγA max{cˆ♯(a), 0} ≤ cˆ⊕(a, piB0 ) + LA (3.11)for each a ∈ A because LA > 0 and c+(a, b) ≥ 0 for each a ∈ A and b ∈ B. The integration of the both
sides of (3.11) in piA leads to
γA
∫
A
max{cˆ♯(a), 0}piA(da) ≤ cˆ⊕(piA, piB0 ) + LA = cˆ(pi
A, piB0 )− cˆ
⊖(piA, piB0 ) + LA. (3.12)
Observe that
−∞ <
∫
B
min{0, cˆ♭(b)}piB0 (db) ≤ cˆ
⊖(piA, piB0 ), (3.13)
where the first inequality in (3.13) follows from the left inequality in (3.6) and the second inequality in
(3.13) follows from (3.5).
Inequalities (3.12) and (3.13) imply that
γA
∫
A
max{cˆ♯(a), 0}piA(da) ≤ cˆ(piA, piB0 ) + LA −
∫
B
min{0, cˆ♭(b)}piB0 (db). (3.14)
Since −∞ < cˆ(piA, piB0 ) ≤ cˆ
♯(piA), inequalities (3.10) and (3.14) imply inequality (3.8).
Now let piA ∈ P(A) satisfy the inequality cˆ♯(piA) < +∞. Observe that piA ∈ PS(A). Indeed, since
cˆ♯(piA) < +∞, then the first inequality in (3.6) and inequality (3.8) imply that
∫
A
∫
B
c+(a, b)piB(db)piA(da) < +∞
for each piB ∈ P(B), that is, piA ∈ PS(A).
Corollary 3.9. Let a two-person zero-sum game {A,B, c} introduced in Definition 2.3 satisfy Assump-
tion (Ma). Then
γA
∫
A
∫
B
c+(a, b)piB(db)piA(da) ≤ cˆ♯(piA) + LA −min{0, cˆ
♭(b0)} (3.15)
for each piA ∈ P(A) and piB ∈ P(B). Furthermore, if piA ∈ P(A) satisfies cˆ♯(piA) < +∞, then piA ∈ PS(A).
Proof. Since Assumption (Ma) implies Assumption (MaW) (see Remark 3.4), then Lemma 3.8 yields all
the statements of Corollary 3.9.
The following Theorem 3.10 and its Corollary 3.19 below, which are the main results of this section,
provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a value for a two-person zero-sum game with possibly
noncompact action sets and unbounded payoffs. These statements also describe the properties of the solution
sets under these conditions. For well-defined payoff functions, the proof of the existence of the value is
usually based on Sion’s theorem (Mertens et al. [16, Theorem I.1.1]), that requires that at least one of the
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Tdecision sets is compact. In our situation, both decision sets may not be compact. In addition, the payofffunction c may be unbounded above and below, and therefore the payoff function cˆ may be undefined forsome pairs of strategies. Because of these reasons, our proof of the existence of the value differs from theclassic ones. In particular, our proof does not use Sion’s theorem. In general, a game on the unit squarewith bounded measurable payoffs may not have a value; see Yanovskaya [19, p. 527] and the referencesto counterexamples by Ville, by Wald, and by Sion and Wolfe cited there. Therefore, some additionalconditions for the existence of a value are needed, and Theorem 3.10 requires mild Assumption (MaW) andassumptions (i,ii) of Lemma 3.1.
Theorem 3.10. Let a two-person zero-sum game {A,B, c} introduced in Definition 2.3 satisfy assump-
tions (i,ii) of Lemma 3.1 and Assumption (MaW). Then the game {A,B, c} has the value v, that is, equality
(2.8) holds. Moreover, the set P
♯
v(A) is a nonempty convex compact subset of P(A).
Remark 3.11. In view of Remark 2.15, under the assumptions of Theorem 3.10 equalities (2.9) hold.
Proof of Theorem 3.10. According to Lemma 3.1, it is sufficient to prove (3.3), which follows from the last
statement of Lemma 3.8.
Next we provide sufficient conditions for the statement
cˆ♭(piB) = −∞ if piB ∈ PU (B), (3.16)
which are similar and symmetric to Assumptions (MaW) and (Ma). Statement (3.16) holds if and only if
P
♭
α(B) ⊂ P
S(B) for each α ∈ R.
Consider the following assumptions:
Assumption (MbW). There exist γB ∈ (0, 1), LB > 0, and pi
A
0 ∈ P(A) such that for each b ∈ B∫
A
max{0, cˆ♯(a)}piA0 (da) < +∞ and cˆ
⊖(piA0 , b) ≤ γBcˆ
♭(b) + LB. (3.17)
Assumption (Mb). There exist γB ∈ (0, 1), LB > 0, and a0 ∈ A such that for each b ∈ B
c−(a0, b) ≤ γBcˆ
♭(b) + LB. (3.18)
Remark 3.12. Assumption (Mb) implies Assumption (MbW) because each action a0 ∈ A for Player I is
identified with the strategy δ{a0} and because of Assumption (v) in Definition 2.3.
Remark 3.13. A two-person zero-sum game {A,B, c} introduced in Definition 2.3 satisfies Assumption (MbW)
(Assumptions (MaW), (Ma), (Mb) respectively) if and only if the game {B,A,−cA↔B} introduced in Re-
mark 2.4 satisfies Assumption (MaW) (Assumptions (MbW), (Mb), (Ma) respectively).
Remark 3.14. Let {A,B, c} be a two-person zero-sum game introduced in Definition 2.3. As follows from
Remarks 3.5 and 3.13, if c is bounded from below on A × B, then Assumption (Mb) holds and, therefore,
Assumption (MbW) holds because the function cˆ♭ is bounded from below on B and the function c− takes
non-positive values. Moreover, PS(A) = P(A) and PS(B) = P(B).
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TRemark 3.15. Let {A,B, c} be a two-person zero-sum game introduced in Definition 2.3. As followsfrom Remarks 2.4, 3.6, 3.13 and 3.14, if the set B is compact and the function c is lower semi-continuous,then Assumption (Mb) holds and, therefore, Assumption (MbW) holds. Furthermore, PS(A) = P(A) andPS(B) = P(B).Remark 3.16. Example 3.7 describes the two-person zero-sum game {A,B, c}with noncompact action setsand unbounded payoffs satisfying Assumption (Ma). Therefore, in view of Remark 3.4, this game satisfiesAssumption (MaW). Since A = B and c(a, b) = −c(b, a) for each a, b = 1, 2, . . . in Example 3.7, thenAssumption (Mb) holds and, in view of Remark 3.12, Assumption (MbW) holds too.
The following lemma and its corollary describe sufficient conditions for (3.16).
Lemma 3.17. Let a two-person zero-sum game {A,B, c} introduced in Definition 2.3 satisfy Assump-
tion (MbW). Then
cˆ♭(piB) ≤ γB
∫
A
∫
B
c−(a, b)piB(db)piA(da) + LB +
∫
A
max{0, cˆ♯(a)}piA0 (da), (3.19)
for each piA ∈ P(A) and piB ∈ P(B). Furthermore, if piB ∈ P(B) and cˆ♭(piB) > −∞, then piB ∈ PS(B).
Proof. The lemma follows from Lemma 3.8 applied to the game {B,A,−cA↔B} introduced in Remark 2.4.
Corollary 3.18. Let a two-person zero-sum game {A,B, c} introduced in Definition 2.3 satisfy Assump-
tion (Mb). Then
cˆ♭(piB) ≤ γB
∫
A
∫
B
c−(a, b)piB(db)piA(da) + LB +max{0, cˆ
♯(a0)} (3.20)
for each piA ∈ P(A) and piB ∈ P(B). Furthermore, if piB ∈ P(B) satisfies cˆ♭(piB) > −∞, then piB ∈ PS(B).
Proof. According to Remark 3.12, Assumption (Mb) implies Assumption (MbW). Thus Lemma 3.17 im-
plies Corollary 3.18.
Corollary 3.19. Let a two-person zero-sum game {A,B, c} introduced in Definition 2.3 satisfy the following
assumptions:
(i) for each b ∈ B the function a 7→ c(a, b) is lower semi-continuous;
(ii) there exists b0 ∈ B such that the function a 7→ c(a, b0) is inf-compact on A;
(iii) for each a ∈ A the function b 7→ c(a, b) is upper semi-continuous;
(vi) there exists a0 ∈ A such that the function b 7→ c(a0, b) is sup-compact on B;
(v) either Assumption (MaW) or Assumption (MbW) holds.
Then the game {A,B, c} has the value v, that is, equality (2.8) holds. Moreover, the sets P♯v(A) and P♭v(B)
are nonempty convex compact subsets of P(A) and P(B) respectively.
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TRemark 3.20. Example 3.7 describes a two-person zero-sum game with noncompact action sets and un-bounded payoffs satisfying the assumptions of Corollary 3.19 and, therefore, in view of Remark 3.13, satis-fying the assumptions of Theorem 3.10.Proof of Corollary 3.19. The existence of a value follows from Theorem 3.10 applied either to the game{A,B, c}, if Assumption (MaW) holds, or to the game {B,A,−cA↔B} if Assumption (MbW) holds. The laststatements of Corollary 3.19 follow from Theorem 3.3 applied to the games {A,B, c} and {B,A,−cA↔B}respectively.
4 Existence of a Solution
In this section we provide the definition of a solution for a two-person zero-sum game with possibly non-
compact action sets for both players and unbounded payoffs. Theorem 4.5 describes sufficient conditions
for the existence of solutions for such games.
Definition 4.1. A pair of strategies (piA, piB) ∈ PS(A) × PS(B) for Players I and II is called a solution
(saddle point, equilibria) of the game {A,B, c}, if
cˆ(piA, piB∗ ) ≤ cˆ(pi
A, piB) ≤ cˆ(piA∗ , pi
B) (4.1)
for each piA∗ ∈ P(A) and pi
B
∗ ∈ P(B). The solution (pi
A, piB) of the game {A,B, c} is pure, if the strategies
piA and piB are pure.
Remark 4.2. If the solution (piA, piB) ∈ PS(A) × PS(B) of the game {A,B, c} exists, then the number
v = cˆ♭(piB) = v♭ = v♯ = cˆ♯(piA) = cˆ(piA, piB) uniquely defines the value of this game. Indeed, since
(piA, piB) ∈ PS(A)× PS(B), then inequalities (4.1) imply that
cˆ♭(piB) = cˆ(piA, piB) = cˆ♯(piA).
Moreover, since cˆ♭(piB∗ ) ≤ cˆ
♯(piA) and cˆ♭(piB) ≤ cˆ♯(piA∗ ) for each (pi
A
∗ , pi
B
∗ ) ∈ P
S(A)× PS(B), then
sup
πB
∗
∈PS(B)
cˆ♭(piB∗ ) = cˆ
♭(piB) and inf
πA
∗
∈PS(A)
cˆ♯(piA∗ ) = cˆ
♯(piA),
because cˆ♭(piB) = cˆ♯(piA). Therefore, v♭ = cˆ♭(piB) = cˆ(piA, piB) = cˆ♯(piA) = v♯. This justifies Defini-
tion 2.14 of the value v of the game {A,B, c}.
Remark 4.3. If a pure solution (a, b) ∈ A×B of the game {A,B, c} exists, then, according to Remark 4.2,
the number
v = cˆ♭(b) = v♭ = v♯ = cˆ♯(a) = c(a, b) (4.2)
is the value of this game. Moreover,
v = sup
b∗∈B
inf
a∗∈A
c(a∗, b∗) = inf
a∗∈A
sup
b∗∈B
c(a∗, b∗)
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Tbecause, by the definitions of cˆ♭ and cˆ♯,supb∗∈B infa∗∈A c(a∗, b∗) = supb∗∈B cˆ♭(b∗), infa∗∈A supb∗∈B c(a∗, b∗) = infa∗∈A cˆ♯(a∗),and, in view of (4.2), infa∗∈A cˆ♯(a∗) ≤ cˆ♯(a) = v = cˆ♭(b) ≤ supb∗∈B cˆ♭(b∗) ≤ infa∗∈A cˆ♯(a∗),where the last inequality follows from (2.5) with piA = δ{a} and piB = δ{b}. Therefore, the game {A,B, c}
has a solution in pure strategies (that is, the players can play only pure strategies, and this game has a
solution) if and only if there is a pure solution of the game {A,B, c}.
Remark 4.4. Let assumptions of Corollary 3.19 hold. Then, according to Remark 3.11, Corollary 3.19 and
Aubin and Ekeland [2, Proposition 1, Chapter 6], there exists a pair of strategies (piA, piB) ∈ P(A) × P(B)
with well-defined cˆ(piA, piB) satisfying inequality (4.1) for each piA∗ ∈ P
S
πB
(A) and piB∗ ∈ P
S
πA
(B).Moreover,
a pair of strategies (piA, piB) ∈ P(A)× P(B) with well-defined cˆ(piA, piB) satisfies inequality (4.1) for each
piA∗ ∈ P
S
πB
(A) and piB∗ ∈ P
S
πA
(B) if and only if piA ∈ P♯v(A) and piB ∈ P♭v(B). Therefore, a pair of safe
strategies (piA, piB) ∈ PS(A) × PS(B) for Players I and II is the solution of the game {A,B, c} if and only
if piA ∈ P♯v(A) and piB ∈ P♭v(B).
The following theorem describes sufficient conditions for the existence of a solution and the structure of
the solution set.
Theorem 4.5. Let a two-person zero-sum game {A,B, c} introduced in Definition 2.3 satisfy conditions
(i–iv) of Corollary 3.19. Moreover, let Assumptions (MaW) and (MbW) hold. Then:
(i) the game {A,B, c} has a value v ∈ R and a solution (piA, piB) ∈ P♯v(A)× P♭v(B);
(ii) the sets P
♯
v(A) and P♭v(B) are nonempty convex compact subsets of P(A) and P(B) respectively;
moreover, P
♯
v(A) ⊂ PS(A) and P♭v(B) ⊂ P
S(B);
(iii) a pair of strategies (piA, piB) ∈ PS(A) × PS(B) is a solution of the game {A,B, c} if and only if
piA ∈ P♯v(A) and piB ∈ P♭v(B).
Proof. Corollary 3.19 implies that the game {A,B, c} has the value v ∈ R, that is, equality (2.8) holds.
Moreover, the sets P
♯
v(A) and P♭v(B) are nonempty convex compact subsets of P(A) and P(B) respectively.
Lemmas 3.8 and 3.17 imply that P
♯
v(A) ⊂ PS(A) and P♭v(B) ⊂ P
S(B) respectively. Therefore, according
to Remark 4.4, the game {A,B, c} has a solution (piA, piB) ∈ P♯v(A)× P♭v(B). Statement (i) is proved.
Statement (ii) holds because P
♯
v(A) ⊂ PS(A), P♭v(B) ⊂ P
S(B), and the sets P♯v(A) and P♭v(B) are
nonempty convex compact subsets of P(A) and P(B) respectively.
Statement (iii) holds because, according to Remarks 4.2 and 4.4, a pair of strategies (piA, piB) ∈ PS(A)×
P
S(B) is a solution of the game {A,B, c} if and only if piA ∈ P♯v(A) and piB ∈ P♭v(B).
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T5 ExamplesIn this section we consider examples of a two-person zero-sum game {A,B, c} with A = B := R+ =[0,+∞) to illustrate the previous results. Since the both action sets A and B are not compact, the onlypreviously available result on the existence of the solution is Aubin and Ekeland [2, Theorem 6.2.7], whichassumes conditions (i) and (ii) of Lemma 3.1, the concavity of c(a, b) in a and convexity of c(a, b) in b.Under these conditions, there exists a solution in pure strategies. In view of Remark 4.3, the same theoremimplies that under its assumptions there exists a pure solution for the game, that is, there exist a pair of
pure strategies piA and piB satisfying (4.1). Another simple condition, when a two-person zero-sum game
{A,B, c} introduced in Definition 2.3 has a pure solution, is that A = B := R+ and the function c(a, b) is
nondecreasing in a and nonincreasing in b. In this case it is optimal for each player to select the decision 0.
The provided examples may satisfy neither of the two described sufficient conditions. In addition, according
to Proposition 5.4, solutions in pure strategies may not exist for the provided examples.
Example 5.1. Let A = B := R+ and c(a, b) := ϕ(a − b) for each a, b ∈ R+, where ϕ : R 7→ R is a
continuous function. Assume that
−∞ < lim inf
s→+∞
ϕ(s) and lim sup
s→−∞
ϕ(s) < +∞. (5.1)
The triple {A,B, c} is a two-person zero-sum game introduced in Definition 2.3 because the function
a 7→ c(a, b) is bounded from below on A for each b ∈ B, if the first inequality in (5.1) holds, and the
function b 7→ c(a, b) is bounded from above on B for each a ∈ A, if the second inequality in (5.1) holds.
Proposition 5.2. Consider the two-person zero-sum game defined in Example 5.1. Then:
(i) if ϕ(s) → +∞ as s → +∞, then the assumptions (i,ii) of Lemma 3.1 and therefore the conclusions
of Theorem 3.3 hold;
(ii) if ϕ(s) → +∞ as s → +∞ and ϕ(s) = ϕ1(s) + ϕ2(s) for each s ∈ R, where ϕ1 : R 7→ R
is increasing and ϕ2 : R 7→ R is bounded, then the assumptions and therefore the conclusions of
Theorem 3.10 hold;
(iii) if ϕ(s) → +∞ as s → +∞, ϕ(s) → −∞ as s → −∞, and ϕ(s) = ϕ1(s) + ϕ2(s) for each s ∈ R,
where ϕ1 : R 7→ R is increasing and ϕ2 : R 7→ R is bounded, then the assumptions and therefore the
conclusions of Theorem 4.5 hold.
Example 5.3. Consider Example 5.1 with the function ϕ being a polynomial of a degree M = 1, 2, . . . ,
that is, ϕ(s) =
∑M
n=0 αns
n, s ∈ R, where αn ∈ R, n = 0, . . . ,M, and aM 6= 0.
Proposition 5.4. Consider the two-person zero-sum game defined in Example 5.3 with the odd integer
M and αM > 0. This game satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 4.5, and therefore the conclusions of
Theorem 4.5 take place for this game. Furthermore, if M ≥ 3 and α1 < 0, then there is no pure solution
for this game.
To prove the propositions, we consider the following lemma.
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TLemma 5.5. Let A = B := R+ and c(a, b) := ϕ(a − b) for each a, b ∈ R+, where ϕ : R 7→ R is acontinuous function. Then the following statements hold:(i) if ϕ(s) → +∞ as s → +∞, then the function (b, a) 7→ c(a, b) is K-inf-compact on B × A (seeDefinition A.1);(ii) if ϕ(s) → −∞ as s → −∞, then the function (a, b) 7→ c(a, b) is K-sup-compact on A × B (seeDefinition A.2);
(iii) if ϕ(s) = ϕ1(s) + ϕ2(s) for each s ∈ R, where ϕ1 : R 7→ R is increasing and ϕ2 : R 7→ R is
bounded, then Assumptions (Ma) and (Mb) hold;
(iv) if there exist s∗ < 0 < s
∗ such that ϕ(s∗) > ϕ(s
∗), then the game {A,B, c} has no pure solution.
Proof. (i): We verify the conditions of Lemma A.4 to prove K-inf-compactess of the function c(a, b) =
ϕ(a − b). This function is continuous, and therefore it is lower semi-continuous. Consider a sequence
{b(n)}n≥1 that converges to b ∈ B and a sequence {a
(n)}n≥1 ⊂ A such that {ϕ(a
(n) − b(n))}n≥1 is
bounded above. Since the sequence {b(n)}n≥1 ⊂ R+ converges, it is bounded. Since the sequence
{ϕ(a(n) − b(n))}n≥1 is bounded above, then the continuity of the function ϕ : R 7→ R on R and the
property ϕ(s) → +∞ as s → +∞ imply that the sequence {a(n) − b(n)}n≥1 is bounded above. Thus, the
sequence {a(n)}n≥1 ⊂ R+ is bounded above and therefore it is bounded. Therefore, the sequence {a
(n)}n≥1
has an accumulation point a ∈ A. Thus, the assumptions of Lemma A.4 are verified, and the function c is
K-inf-compact.
(ii): This statement follows from (i) applied to the game {B,A,−cA↔B}.
(iii): First, we prove that Assumption (Mb) holds. Let the function ϕ be the sum of the functions ϕ1 and
ϕ2 described in the statement. Then for each b ≥ 0
c♭(b) = inf
a≥0
{ϕ1(a− b) + ϕ2(a− b)} ≥ inf
a≥0
ϕ1(a− b) + inf
a≥0
ϕ2(a− b)
= ϕ1(−b) + inf
a≥0
ϕ2(a− b) = c(0, b) + inf
a≥0
ϕ2(a− b) ≥ c(0, b) −B,
where B > 0 is a constant such that |ϕ2(s)| ≤ B for each s ∈ R. We note that the second equality holds
because the function ϕ1 is increasing. Therefore, for each b ≥ 0
c−(0, b) ≤
1
2
c−(0, b) ≤
1
2
c♭(b) +
B
2
.
This implies that Assumption (Mb) holds.
Second, Assumption (Ma) holds because it is equivalent to Assumption (Mb) for the game {B,A,−cA↔B},
which holds because the real function ϕ1 is increasing if and only if the real function s 7→ −ϕ1(−s) is in-
creasing and the function ϕ2 is bounded if and only if the function s 7→ −ϕ2(−s) is bounded.
(iv): There exist s∗, s
∗ ∈ R such that s∗ < 0 < s
∗ and ϕ(s∗) > ϕ(s
∗). Then for each a, b ≥ 0
c♭(b) = inf
a∗≥0
ϕ(a∗ − b) ≤ ϕ(s∗), c♯(a) = sup
b∗≥0
ϕ(a− b∗) ≥ ϕ(s∗).
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TTherefore, supb≥0 c♭(b) ≤ ϕ(s∗) < ϕ(s∗) ≤ infa≥0 c♯(a),that is, the game {A,B, c} has no pure solution.Proof of Proposition 5.2. (i) In view of Lemma 5.5(i), the function (b, a) 7→ c(a, b) is K-inf-compact onB × A. This implies conditions (i) and (ii) of Lemma 3.1. Statement (ii) follows from Lemma 5.5(i,iii).Statement (iii) follows from Lemma 5.5(i-iii).
Proof of Proposition 5.4. The proposition follows from Lemma 5.5.
Remark 5.6. A game with a polynomial payoff described in Example 5.3 satisfies the assumptions from
Definition 2.3 only if the degree of the polynomial M is odd and αM > 0, as stated in Proposition 5.4. If
these assumptions are violated, the real-valued value does not exist forM > 0. To proof this, let us consider
three cases (c1–c3).
(c1): Let M be even and αM > 0. Then condition (v) from Definition 2.3 does not hold because the
function b 7→ c(a, b) is not bounded from above for each a ≥ 0. Since the function ϕ is bounded from below
on R, the value cˆ(piA, piB) is well-defined for all (piA, piB) ∈ P(A)× P(B) and
sup
πB∈P(B)
inf
πA∈P(A)
cˆ(piA, piB) = inf
πA∈P(A)
sup
πB∈P(B)
cˆ(piA, piB) = +∞. (5.2)
Indeed, if we set piB(B) := 2π
∫
B
1
1+b2
db for each B ∈ B(B), then for all a ∈ A
cˆ(a, piB) =
2
pi
∫
R+
ϕ(a− b)
1 + b2
db = +∞.
Therefore, cˆ♭(piB) = infπA∈P(A) cˆ(pi
A, piB) = infa≥0 cˆ(a, pi
B) = +∞ and
+∞ ≤ cˆ♭(piB) ≤ sup
πB
∗
∈P(B)
cˆ♭(piB∗ ) = sup
πB∈P(B)
inf
πA∈P(A)
cˆ(piA, piB) ≤ inf
πA∈P(A)
sup
πB∈P(B)
cˆ(piA, piB).
Thus, equalities (5.2) hold.
(c2): If M is even and αM < 0, then condition (iv) from Definition 2.3 does not hold, because the
function a 7→ c(a, b) is not bounded from below for each b ≥ 0. Since the function ϕ is bounded from
above onR, the value cˆ(piA, piB) is well-defined for all (piA, piB) ∈ P(A)×P(B).Moreover, by the symmetric
reasonings, which follow from case (c1),
sup
πB∈P(B)
inf
πA∈P(A)
cˆ(piA, piB) = inf
πA∈P(A)
sup
πB∈P(B)
cˆ(piA, piB) = −∞.
(c3): If M is odd and αM < 0, then conditions (iv,v) from Definition 2.3 do not hold. Moreover, the
lower value for this game in pure strategies equals −∞ and the upper value for this game in pure strategies
equals +∞.
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T6 Continuity Properties of EquilibriaIn this section we provide sufficient conditions for continuity of value functions, upper semi-continuityof solution multifunctions, and compactness of solution sets for zero-sum stochastic games with possiblynoncompact action sets and unbounded payoff functions.We start with the definition of a family of games with action sets and payoff functions depending ona parameter. Let X, A and B be Borel subsets of Polish spaces, KA ∈ B(X × A), where B(X × A) =B(X)⊗ B(A), and KB ∈ B(X × B), where B(X × B) = B(X)⊗ B(B). It is assumed that for each x ∈ X
the sets KA and KB satisfy the following two conditions:
A(x) := {a ∈ A : (x, a) ∈ KA} 6= ∅ and B(x) := {b ∈ B : (x, b) ∈ KB} 6= ∅.
Let
K := {(x, a, b) ∈ X× A× B : x ∈ X, a ∈ A(x), b ∈ B(x)}.
Remark 6.1. We note that Gr(A) = KA, Gr(B) = KB, and K = Gr(A × B), where (A × B)(x) :=
{(a, b) : a ∈ A(x), b ∈ B(x)}, x ∈ X. We note also that K = Gr(B˜), where B˜(x, a) := B(x),
(x, a) ∈ KA. If we set A˜(x, b) := A(x), (x, b) ∈ KB, then Gr(A˜) = {(x, b, a) : (x, a, b) ∈ K} and
K = {(x, a, b) : (x, b, a) ∈ Gr(A˜)}.
Consider the family of two-person zero-sum games
{{A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} : x ∈ X}
satisfying for each x ∈ X all the assumptions from Definition 2.3. Define the function cA↔B : Gr(A˜) ⊂
(X× B)× A 7→ R
cA↔B(x, b, a) := c(x, a, b), (x, a, b) ∈ K. (6.1)
In this section we consider the following assumptions:
Assumption (A1). The function cA↔B : Gr(A˜) ⊂ (X × B) × A 7→ R defined in (6.1) on the set Gr(A˜)
introduced in Remark 6.1, is K-inf-compact on Gr(A˜);
Assumption (A2). The function c : K ⊂ (X× A)× B 7→ R is K-sup-compact on K;
Assumption (A3). A : X 7→ S(A) is a lower semi-continuous set-valued mapping;
Assumption (A4). B : X 7→ S(B) is a lower semi-continuous set-valued mapping.
The notion and basic properties of K-inf-compact functions are provided in Appendix B.
Remark 6.2. According to Lemma A.4 and Remark 6.1, Assumption (A1) holds if and only if the following
two conditions hold:
(i) the mapping c : K ⊂ X× A× B 7→ R is lower semi-continuous;
(ii) if a sequence {x(n), b(n)}n=1,2,... with values inKB converges and its limit (x, b) belongs toKB, then
each sequence {a(n)}n=1,2,... with (x
(n), a(n), b(n)) ∈ K, n = 1, 2, . . . , satisfying the condition that
the sequence {c(x(n), a(n), b(n))}n=1,2,... is bounded above, has a limit point a ∈ A(x).
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TRemark 6.3. According to Lemma A.4 and Remark 6.1, Assumption (A2) holds if and only if the followingtwo conditions hold:(i) the mapping c : K ⊂ X× A× B 7→ R is upper semi-continuous;(ii) if a sequence {x(n), a(n)}n=1,2,... with values inKA converges and its limit (x, a) belongs toKA, theneach sequence {b(n)}n=1,2,... with (x(n), a(n), b(n)) ∈ K, n = 1, 2, . . . , satisfying the condition thatthe sequence {c(x(n), a(n), b(n))}n=1,2,... is bounded from below, has a limit point b ∈ B(x).Remark 6.4. Assumptions (A1) and (A2) imply that the payoff from Player I to Player II,−∞ < c(x, a, b) <
+∞, for choosing actions a ∈ A(x) and b ∈ B(x) at a state x ∈ X, is a continuous function. Indeed, a
K-inf-compact function is lower semi-continuous and a K-sup-compact function is upper semi-continuous.
Remark 6.5. Let {{A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} : x ∈ X} be the family of two-person zero-sum games.
Further let cˆ♯(x) and cˆ♭(x) be defined in (2.2) and v♭(x), v♯(x), and v(x) denote the lower value, the upper
value, and the value of the game {A(x), B(x), c(x, ·, ·)} if they exist, x ∈ X.
The following Theorem 6.6 provides sufficient conditions for the lower semi-continuity of the value
for a family of two-person zero-sum games with possibly noncompact action sets and unbounded payoffs.
Theorem 6.6 follows from Theorem 3.10 and Feinberg et al. [10, Theorem 21]. Under Assumptions (A1,
A4), [10, Theorem 21] states that
sup
πB∈PS(B(x))
cˆ♭(x, piB) = inf
πA∈P(A(x))
cˆ♯(x, piA),
the function v♭(x) = sup
πB∈PS(B(x))
cˆ♭(x, piB) takes real values and is lower semi-continuous, and statement
(ii) of Theorem 6.6 holds when the value function v is substituted with the lower value function v♭(x).
Theorem 6.6. Let a family of two-person zero-sum games {{A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} : x ∈ X} satisfy
Assumptions (A1, A4) and for each x ∈ X the game {A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} satisfy Assumption (MaW).
Then the following statements hold:
(i) for each x ∈ X the game {A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} has the value v(x), that is,
v♭(x) = sup
πB∈PS(B(x))
cˆ♭(x, piB) = inf
πA∈PS(A(x))
cˆ♯(x, piA) = v♯(x) = v(x); (6.2)
moreover, v : X 7→ R is a lower semi-continuous function;
(ii) the sets {P♯
v(x)(A(x)) : x ∈ X} satisfy the following properties:
(a) for each x ∈ X the set P♯
v(x)(A(x)) is a nonempty convex compact subset of P(A);
(b) the graph Gr(P♯
v( · )(A( · ))) = {(x, pi
A) : x ∈ X, piA ∈ P♯
v(x)(A(x))} is a Borel subset of
X× P(A);
(c) there exists a measurable mapping φA : X 7→ P(A) such that φA(x) ∈ P♯
v(x)(A(x)) for each
x ∈ X.
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TProof. Definition A.1 of a K-inf-compact function implies that for each (x, b), such that x ∈ X and b ∈B(x), the function a 7→ c(x, b, a) is inf-compact on the set A(x). Therefore, for each x ∈ X the game{A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} satisfies assumptions (i,ii) of Lemma 3.1. Therefore, in view of Theorem 3.10,this game has the value v(x). Lower semi-continuity of the value function v and statement (ii) follow fromFeinberg et al. [10, Theorem 21]. Thus, statements (i) and (ii) are proved.The following example describes a family of two-person zero-sum games satisfying the assumptions ofTheorem 6.6. Payoff functions are unbounded and decision sets are noncompact for the games in this family.
Example 6.7. Let X = A = B = R, KA = KB = R
2, K = R3, c(x, a, b) = ϕX(x) + ϕA(a) + ϕB(b),
(x, a, b) ∈ K, where ϕX, ϕA, ϕB : R 7→ R are continuous functions such that ϕB is bounded above and
ϕA(a)→ +∞ as |a| → ∞. The function c : R
3 7→ R is continuous since it is a sum of continuous functions.
For each x ∈ X the tuple {A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} is a game via Definition 2.3 because A = B = R are
Borel spaces, c is measurable, ϕA is bounded below, and ϕB is bounded above. Assumptions (A1) and (A4)
are verified in Feinberg et al. [10, Example 4].
Let us fix an arbitrary x ∈ X and verify Assumption (MaW) for the game {A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )}.
Since the function ϕB is bounded above, there exists b0 ∈ R such that supb∈R ϕB(b) ≤ ϕB(b0) + 1. For a
fixed γA ∈ (0, 1), let us define LA := (γA − 1)(ϕX(x) + infa∗∈R ϕA(a
∗) + ϕB(b0))
− + γA > 0. Then, for
all x, a ∈ R,
γAcˆ
♯(a)− LA =γA(ϕX(x) + ϕA(a) + sup
b∗∈R
ϕB(b
∗))− LA
≤γA (ϕX(x) + ϕA(a) + ϕB(b0) + 1)− LA
=c(x, a, b0)− (1− γA) (ϕX(x) + ϕA(a) + ϕB(b0)) + γA − LA
≤c(x, a, b0) + (γA − 1)(ϕX(x) + inf
a∗∈R
ϕA(a
∗) + ϕB(b0))
− + γA − LA ≤ c
+(x, a, b0),
where the second inequality holds because ϕA is bounded below. Therefore, this family of two-person
zero-sum games satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 6.6.
The following theorem describes sufficient conditions for the continuity of the value function and upper
semi-continuity of the solution multifunctions for a family of two-person zero-sum games with possibly
noncompact action sets and unbounded payoffs.
Theorem 6.8. Let a family of two-person zero-sum games {{A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} : x ∈ X} satisfy
Assumptions (A1–A4) and for each x ∈ X the game {A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} satisfy Assumptions (MaW)
and (MbW). Then the following statements hold:
(i) for each x ∈ X the game {A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} has the value v(x) and the solution (piA, piB) ∈
P
♯
v(x)(A(x)) × P
♭
v(x)(B(x)). Moreover, P
♯
v(x)(A(x)) ⊂ P
S(A(x)) and P♭v(x)(B(x)) ⊂ P
S(B(x)) for
each x ∈ X, and v : X 7→ R is a continuous function;
(ii) the sets {P♯
v(x)(A(x)) : x ∈ X} satisfy the following properties:
(a) for each x ∈ X the set P♯
v(x)(A(x)) is a nonempty convex compact subset of P(A);
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T(b) the multifunction P♯v( · )(A( · )) : X 7→ K(P(A)) is upper semi-continuous;(iii) the sets {P♭v(x)(B(x)) : x ∈ X} satisfy the following properties:(a) for each x ∈ X the set P♭v(x)(B(x)) is a nonempty convex compact subset of P(B);(b) the multifunction P♭v( · )(B( · )) : X 7→ K(P(B)) is upper semi-continuous;(iv) there exist measurable mappings φA : X 7→ P(A) and φB : X 7→ P(B) such that φA(x) ∈P♯v(x)(A(x)) and φB(x) ∈ P♭v(x)(B(x)) for all x ∈ X. Moreover, for each x ∈ X a pair of strategies
(piA(x), piB(x)) ∈ PS(A(x))×PS(B(x)) is a solution of the game {A(x), B(x), c(x, ·, ·)} if and only
if piA(x) ∈ P♯
v(x)(A(x)) and pi
B(x) ∈ P♭v(x)(B(x)).
Proof. (i), (ii)(a), (iii)(a): Definition A.1 of a K-inf-compact function implies that for each (x, b), such that
x ∈ X and b ∈ B(x), the function a 7→ c(x, b, a) is inf-compact on the set A(x). Similarly, Definition A.2
of a K-sup-compact function implies that for each (x, a), such that x ∈ X and a ∈ A(x), the function b 7→
c(x, b, a) is sup-compact on the set B(x). Therefore, for each x ∈ X, the game {A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )}
satisfies assumptions (i–iv) of Corollary 3.19 in addition to Assumptions (MaW) and (MbW) stated in
the theorem. Theorem 4.5 implies that for each x ∈ X the game {A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} has the value
v(x) and the solution (piA, piB) ∈ P♯
v(x)(A(x)) × P
♭
v(x)(B(x)). Moreover, P
♯
v(x)(A(x)) ⊂ P
S(A(x)) and
P
♭
v(x)(B(x)) ⊂ P
S(B(x)) for each x ∈ X. Lower semi-continuity of the value function v and statement
(ii)(a) follow from statements (i) and (ii)(a) of Theorem 6.6 respectively. For x ∈ X, let us consider the
game {B(x), A(x),−cA↔B(x, · , · )}, where the function cA↔B is defined in (6.1). As follows from the
definition of this game and (6.1), the value of this game is −v(x). Upper semi-continuity of the value func-
tion v and statement (iii)(a) follow from respective statements (i) and (ii)(a) of Theorem 6.6, being applied
to {{B(x), A(x),−cA↔B(x, · , · )} : x ∈ X}. Therefore, statements (i), (ii)(a), and (iii)(a) hold.
(ii)(b): Let us consider the function cˆA↔B : Gr(P(A˜( · , · ))) ⊂ (X× B)× P(A) 7→ R ∪ {+∞},
cˆA↔B(x, b, piA) =
∫
A(x)
c(x, a, b)piA(da), (x, b) ∈ KB, pi
A ∈ P(A˜(x, b)),
where A˜ is defined in Remark 6.1. This function is K-inf-compact on Gr(P(A˜( · , · ))) because of Assump-
tion (A1) and Theorem A.8 applied to X := X × B, Y := A, f := cA↔B on Gr(A˜), and f := +∞
on the complement of Gr(A˜). Here we note that the function cˆA↔B takes values in R ∪ {+∞} because
for each x ∈ X and b ∈ B(x) the function a 7→ c(x, a, b) is bounded below on A(x) due to its inf-
compactness on A(x); see Assumption (A1) and Definition A.1. Therefore, Statement (ii)(b) follows
from Theorem B.3 applied to X := X, A := P(A), B := B, ΦA( · ) := P(A( · )), ΦB( · ) := B( · ), and
f(x, piA, b) := cˆ(x, piA, b), (x, piA, b) ∈ {(x, piA, b) ∈ X × P(A) × B : (x, b) ∈ KB, pi
A ∈ P(A(x))}
since the function cˆA↔B : Gr(P(A˜( · , · ))) ⊂ (X × B) × P(A) 7→ R ∪ {+∞}, is K-inf-compact on
Gr(P(A˜( · , · ))).
(iii)(b): Statement (iii)(b) follows from statement (ii)(b) of Theorem 6.8 applied to {{B(x), A(x),
−cA↔B(x, · , · )} : x ∈ X}.
(iv): Statement (iv) directly follow from statements (ii,iii), Theorem 4.5(iii), and the Arsenin-Kunugui
measurable selection theorem (Kechris [15, p. 297]) because the multifunctions P
♯
v( · )(A( · )) : X 7→
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TK(P(A)) and P♭v( · )(B( · )) : X 7→ K(P(B)) are upper semi-continuous and, therefore, their graphs areclosed sets; Kechris [15, pp. 200–201].The following example describes a family of two-person zero-sum games satisfying the assumptions ofTheorem 6.8. Payoff functions are unbounded and decision sets are noncompact for the games in this family.Example 6.9. Let X := R, A = B = A(x) = B(x) := R+ for each x ∈ R and c(x, a, b) := ψ(x) +ϕ(a − b) for each x ∈ R and a, b ∈ R+, where ψ : R 7→ R is a continuous function and ϕ(s) =∑Mn=0 αnsn, s ∈ R, is a polynomial of an odd degree M such that aM > 0. For each x ∈ X the game
{A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} satisfies Assumptions (MaW) and (MbW). This follows from Proposition 5.4. Let
us verify Assumption (A1). Since ψ and ϕ are continuous functions, c is a continuous function; in particular,
this function is lower semi-continuous. Lemma 5.5(i) implies that the function (b, a) 7→ ϕ(a − b) is K-inf-
compact on R2+. Thus, if a sequence {x
(n), b(n)}n=1,2,... with values in R×R+ converges and its limit (x, b)
belongs to R × R+, then each sequence {a
(n)}n=1,2,... ⊂ R+, satisfying the condition that the sequence
{ψ(x(n)) + ϕ(a(n) − b(n))}n=1,2,... is bounded above, has a limit point a ∈ R+ because the sequence
{ψ(x(n))}n=1,2,... is bounded and the function (b, a) 7→ ϕ(a − b) is K-inf-compact on R
2
+. Therefore,
according to Remark 6.2, Assumption (A1) holds. This implies that the function −cA↔B : Gr(A˜) =
(R×R+)×R+ 7→ R defined in (6.1) isK-sup-compact onGr(A˜).Observe that−c
A↔B(x, b, a) = −ψ(x)+∑M
n=0(−1)
n+1αn(b − a)
n is the sum of an arbitrary continuous function of x and an arbitrary polynomial
of Player’s II action subtracted from Player’s I action with an odd degree M and positive coefficient in
front of the summand with the power M in the polynomial. This is exactly how the payoff function c is
defined. Thus, Assumption (A2) holds. Assumptions (A3) and (A4) hold because the multi-valued mapping
Φ : R 7→ S(R+) with Φ(s) = R+, s ∈ R, is lower semi-continuous on R. Thus, this family of two-person
zero-sum games satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 6.8.
6.1 Continuity of Equilibria in Pure Strategies
This subsection describes sufficient conditions for the continuity of the value function and upper semi-
continuity of the pure solution multifunctions for a family of two-person zero-sum games with possibly
noncompact action sets and unbounded payoffs. We recall that, according to Remark 4.3, a solution of the
game is pure if and only if it is a solution to the game with both players using only pure strategies.
Theorem 6.10. Let the family of two-person zero-sum games {{A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} : x ∈ X} satisfy
Assumptions (A1, A4). If for each x ∈ X the game {A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} has a value v(x) in pure
strategies, that is, the equality
sup
b∈B(x)
inf
a∈A(x)
c(x, a, b) = inf
a∈A(x)
sup
b∈B(x)
c(x, a, b) (6.3)
holds, then the following statements hold:
(i) for each x ∈ X
v♭(x) = sup
b∈B(x)
cˆ♭(x, b) = sup
b∈B(x)
inf
a∈A(x)
c(x, a, b)
= inf
a∈A(x)
sup
b∈B(x)
c(x, a, b) = inf
a∈A(x)
cˆ♯(x, a) = v♯(x) = v(x);
(6.4)
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Tmoreover, v : X 7→ R is a lower semi-continuous function;(ii) the sets {A♯v(x)(x) := {a ∈ A : cˆ♯(x, a) = v(x)} : x ∈ X} satisfy the following properties:(a) for each x ∈ X the set A♯v(x)(x) is a nonempty compact subset of A;(b) the graph Gr(A♯v( · )( · )) = {(x, a) : x ∈ X, a ∈ A♯v(x)(x)} is a Borel subset of X×A;(c) there exists a measurable mapping a( · ) : X 7→ A such that a(x) ∈ A♯v(x)(x) for each x ∈ X.Proof. Assumptions (A1, A4) and (6.3) imply equalities (6.4) because
sup
b∈B(x)
inf
a∈A(x)
c(x, a, b) ≤ v♭(x) ≤ v♯(x) ≤ inf
a∈A(x)
sup
b∈B(x)
c(x, a, b) = sup
b∈B(x)
inf
a∈A(x)
c(x, a, b); (6.5)
see also Feinberg et al. [10, Remark 15] for the inequalities from (6.5). Therefore, statements (i) and
(ii)(a,b) follow from Theorem B.2 applied to X := X, A := A, B := B, ΦA := A, ΦB := B, and f := c.
Statement (ii)(c) follows from statements (ii)(a,b) and the Arsenin-Kunugui measurable selection theorem;
Kechris [15, p. 297].
Theorem 6.11. Let a family of two-person zero-sum games {{A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} : x ∈ X} satisfy
Assumptions (A1–A4). If for each x ∈ X the game {A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} has a value v(x) in pure
strategies, that is, the equality (6.3) holds, then the following statements hold:
(i) the value function v : X 7→ R defined in (6.4) is a continuous function;
(ii) the sets {A♯
v(x)(x) := {a ∈ A : cˆ
♯(x, a) = v♯(x)} : x ∈ X} satisfy the following properties:
(a) for each x ∈ X the set A♯
v(x)(x) is a nonempty compact subset of A;
(b) the multifunction A
♯
v( · )( · ) : X 7→ K(A) is upper semi-continuous;
(iii) the sets {B♭v(x)(x) := {b ∈ B : cˆ
♭(x, b) = v♭(x)} : x ∈ X} satisfy the following properties:
(a) for each x ∈ X the set B♭v(x)(x) is a nonempty compact subset of B;
(b) the multifunction B♭v( · )( · ) : X 7→ K(B) is upper semi-continuous.
(iv) there exist measurable mappings a( · ) : X 7→ A and b( · ) : X 7→ B such that a(x) ∈ A♯
v(x)(x) and
b(x) ∈ B♭v(x)(x) for all x ∈ X. Moreover, for each x ∈ X a pair of strategies (a(x), b(x)) ∈ A(x)×
B(x) is a solution of the game {A(x), B(x), c(x, ·, ·)} in pure strategies if and only if a(x) ∈ A♯
v(x)(x)
and b(x) ∈ B♭v(x)(x).
Proof. Statements (i), (ii)(a) and (iii)(a) follow from Theorem 6.10 applied twice to {{A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} :
x ∈ X} and {{B(x), A(x),−cA↔B(x, · , · )} : x ∈ X}, where cA↔B is defined in (6.1). Statement (ii)(b)
follows from Theorem B.3 applied to X := X, A := A, B := B, ΦA := A, ΦB := B, and f := c. State-
ment (iii)(b) follows from statement (ii)(b) applied to {{B(x), A(x),−cA↔B(x, · , · )} : x ∈ X}. State-
ment (iv) directly follow from statements (ii,iii) and the Arsenin-Kunugui measurable selection theorem
(Kechris [15, p. 297]) because the multifunctions A
♯
v( · )( · ) : X 7→ K(A) and B
♭
v( · )( · ) : X 7→ K(B) are
upper semi-continuous and, therefore, their graphs are closed sets; Kechris [15, pp. 200–201].
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TThe following two corollaries are versions of Theorems 6.10 and 6.11 respectively, when a family of two-person zero-sum games {{A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} : x ∈ X} satisfies the following additional assumption,which, being combined with mild continuity assumptions, implies the existence of values; see Aubin andEkeland [2, Proposition 6.2.7].Assumption (Co). Let the following conditions hold:(i) the sets A and B are convex subsets of vector spaces and the sets A(x) and B(x) are convex foreach x ∈ X;
(ii) the function a 7→ c(x, a, b) is convex on A(x) for each x ∈ X and b ∈ B(x);
(iii) the function b 7→ c(x, a, b) is concave on B(x) for each x ∈ X and a ∈ A(x).
Corollary 6.12. Let the family of two-person zero-sum games {{A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} : x ∈ X} satisfy
Assumptions (A1, A4) and (Co). Then the following statements hold:
(i) for each x ∈ X the game {A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} has a value v(x) in pure strategies, that is,
v♭(x) = sup
b∈B(x)
cˆ♭(x, b) = sup
b∈B(x)
inf
a∈A(x)
c(x, a, b)
= inf
a∈A(x)
sup
b∈B(x)
c(x, a, b) = inf
a∈A(x)
cˆ♯(x, a) = v♯(x) = v(x);
(6.6)
moreover, v : X 7→ R is a lower semi-continuous function;
(ii) the convex sets {A♯
v(x)(x) := {a ∈ A : cˆ
♯(x, a) = v♯(x)} : x ∈ X} satisfy the properties (ii)(a–c) of
Theorem 6.11.
Proof. Assumptions (A1, A4) and (Co) and Feinberg et al. [10, Proposition 1 and Remark 15] imply that for
each x ∈ X the game {A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} has a value v(x) in pure strategies and, therefore, according
to Theorem 6.10(i), equalities (6.6) hold. The remaining statements follow from Theorem 6.10. We note
that the set A
♯
v(x)(x) is convex for each x ∈ X due to its definition and Assumption (Co).
Corollary 6.13. Let a family of two-person zero-sum games {{A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} : x ∈ X} sat-
isfy Assumptions (A1–A4) and (Co). Then statements (i)–(iv) of Theorem 6.11 hold. Moreover, the sets
{A♯
v(x)(x), B
♭
v(x)(x) : x ∈ X} defined in Theorem 6.11 are convex.
Proof. Corollary 6.13 follows from Theorem 6.11. The convexity of the sets {A♯
v(x)(x), B
♭
v(x)(x) : x ∈
X} follows from Corollary 6.12 applied twice to the families {{A(x), B(x), c(x, · , · )} : x ∈ X} and
{{B(x), A(x),−cA↔B(x, · , · )} : x ∈ X}, where cA↔B is defined in (6.1).
Appendix A K-inf-compact Functions
This appendix provides definitions and properties of K-inf-compact functions and relevant results used in
this paper. The notion of aK-inf-compact function was introduced in [8] for strict set-valued multifunctions.
The main motivation was to establish continuity properties for optimization problems. However, for games
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Tthere is a need to consider K-inf-compact functions for multifunctions that can have empty image sets, andthis was done in [10].Let X and Y be metric spaces. For a set-valued mapping Φ : X 7→ 2Y, letDomΦ := {x ∈ X : Φ(x) 6= ∅}.A set-valued mapping Φ : X 7→ 2Y is called strict if DomΦ = X, that is, Φ : X 7→ S(Y) or, equivalently,Φ(x) 6= ∅ for each x ∈ X. For Z ⊂ X define the graph of a set-valued mapping Φ : X 7→ 2Y, restrictedto Z:
GrZ(Φ) = {(x, y) ∈ Z × Y : x ∈ DomΦ, y ∈ Φ(x)}.
When Z = X, we use the standard notation Gr(Φ) for the graph of Φ : X 7→ 2Y instead of GrX(Φ).
Throughout this appendix assume that DomΦ 6= ∅. The following definition introduces a notion of a
K-inf-compact function defined on GrX(Φ) for Φ : X 7→ 2
Y, while in [8] such functions are defined for
Φ : X 7→ S(Y).
Definition A.1. (Feinberg et al. [10, Definition 1]) A function f : Gr(Φ) ⊂ X × Y 7→ R is called K-inf-
compact on Gr(Φ), if for every C ∈ K(DomΦ) this function is inf-compact on GrC(Φ).
Definition A.2. (Feinberg et al. [10, Definition 2]) A function f : Gr(Φ) ⊂ X × Y 7→ R is called K-sup-
compact on Gr(Φ) if the function −f is K-inf-compact on Gr(Φ).
Remark A.3. According to Remark 2.1, a function f : Gr(Φ) ⊂ X × Y 7→ R is K-inf-compact / K-sup-
compact on Gr(Φ) if and only if f : Gr(Φ) ⊂ DomΦ × Y 7→ R is K-inf-compact / K-sup-compact on
Gr(Φ), where DomΦ is considered as a metric space with the same metric as on X.
The topological meaning of K-inf-compactness of a function on a graph of a strict set-valued mapping
Φ : X 7→ S(Y) is explained in Feinberg et al. [8, Lemma 2.5]; see also Feinberg et al. [5, Lemma 2] and
[6, p. 1041]. The following lemma provides necessary and sufficient conditions for K-inf-compactness of a
function f : Gr(Φ) ⊂ X× Y 7→ R for a possibly non-strict set-valued mapping Φ : X 7→ 2Y.
Lemma A.4. (Feinberg et al. [10, Lemma 2]) The function f : Gr(Φ) ⊂ X × Y 7→ R is K-inf-compact on
Gr(Φ) if and only if the following two assumptions hold:
(i) f : Gr(Φ) ⊂ X× Y 7→ R is lower semi-continuous;
(ii) if a sequence {x(n)}n=1,2,... with values in DomΦ converges in X and its limit x belongs to DomΦ,
then each sequence {y(n)}n=1,2,... with y
(n) ∈ Φ(x(n)), n = 1, 2, . . . , satisfying the condition that
the sequence {f(x(n), y(n))}n=1,2,... is bounded above, has a limit point y ∈ Φ(x).
The following corollary establishes that assumption (i) in Lemma A.4 can be substituted with the con-
dition that all the level sets {Df (λ; Gr(Φ))}λ∈R are closed in X× Y.
Corollary A.5. (Feinberg et al. [10, Corollary 1]) Let Φ : X 7→ S(Y) be a strict set-valued mapping and
f : Gr(Φ) ⊂ X × Y 7→ R be a function satisfying assumption (ii) of Lemma A.4. Then for each λ ∈ R
the set Df (λ; Gr(Φ)) is closed in X × Y if and only if the function f : Gr(Φ) ⊂ X × Y 7→ R is lower
semi-continuous.
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TA set-valued mapping F : X 7→ 2Y is upper semi-continuous at x ∈ DomF if, for each neighborhood Gof the set F (x), there is a neighborhood of x, say U(x), such that F (x∗) ⊂ G for all x∗ ∈ U(x) ∩DomF ;a set-valued mapping F : X 7→ 2Y is lower semi-continuous at x ∈ DomF if, for each open set G withF (x)∩G 6= ∅, there is a neighborhood of x, say U(x), such that if x∗ ∈ U(x)∩DomF, then F (x∗)∩G 6= ∅(see e.g., Berge [3, p. 109] or Zgurovsky et al. [20, Chapter 1, p. 7]). A set-valued mapping is called upper/ lower semi-continuous if it is upper / lower semi-continuous at all x ∈ DomF. A set-valued mappingF : X 7→ 2Y is K-upper semi-compact if for each C ∈ K(DomΦ) the set GrC(F ) is compact; see Feinberget al. [6, Definition 2.3].
The following lemma provides two sufficient conditions for K-inf-compactness of a function.
Lemma A.6. (Feinberg et al. [10, Lemma 3]) Let Φ : X 7→ 2Y be a set-valued mapping and f : Gr(Φ) ⊂
X× Y 7→ R be a function. Then the following statements hold:
(a) if f : Gr(Φ) ⊂ X×Y 7→ R is inf-compact on Gr(Φ), then the function f isK-inf-compact onGr(Φ);
(b) if f : Gr(Φ) ⊂ X× Y 7→ R is lower semi-continuous and Φ : X 7→ 2Y is upper semi-continuous and
compact-valued at each x ∈ DomΦ, then the function f is K-inf-compact on Gr(Φ).
The following lemma provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for K-upper semi-compactness
of a possibly non-strict set-valued mapping Φ : X 7→ 2Y.
Lemma A.7. (Feinberg et al. [10, Lemma 4]) A set-valued mapping Φ : X 7→ 2Y is K-upper semi-compact
if and only if it is upper semi-continuous and compact-valued at each x ∈ DomΦ.
Theorem A.8. (Feinberg et al. [10, Corollary 2]) Let X,Y be nonempty Borel subsets of Polish spaces. If
f : X×Y 7→ R∪{+∞} is aK-inf-compact function onX×Y, then the function fˆ : X×P(Y) 7→ R∪{+∞},
fˆ(x, z) :=
∫
Y
f(x, y)z(dy), x ∈ X, z ∈ P(Y),
is K-inf-compact on X× P(Y).
Appendix B Continuity Properties of Minimax
This appendix describes continuity properties of minimax operators used in this paper. Let X, A and B be
metric spaces, ΦA : X 7→ S(A) and ΦB : X 7→ S(B) be set-valued mappings, K := {(x, a, b) ∈ X × A × B :
a ∈ ΦA(x), b ∈ ΦB(x)}, and f : K ⊂ X× A× B 7→ R be a function. Define the worst-loss function
f
♯(x, a) := sup
b∈ΦB(x)
f(x, a, b), (x, a) ∈ Gr(ΦA), (B.1)
the minimax or upper value function
v
♯(x) := inf
a∈ΦA(x)
sup
b∈ΦB(x)
f(x, a, b), x ∈ X, (B.2)
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Tand the solution multifunctionΦ∗A(x) := {a ∈ ΦA(x) : v♯(x) = supb∈ΦB(x) f(x, a, b)}, x ∈ X. (B.3)We note that the following equalities hold:v♯(x) = infa∈ΦA(x) f♯(x, a), Φ∗A(x) = {a ∈ ΦA(x) : v♯(x) = f♯(x, a)}, x ∈ X.Let us introduce the set-valued mapping ΦA↔BB : X× B 7→ 2A uniquely defined as
Φ
A↔B
B
(x, b) = ΦA(x), (x, b) ∈ Gr(ΦB). (B.4)
We also introduce the function fA↔B : Gr(ΦA↔B
B
) ⊂ (X× B)× A 7→ R,
f
A↔B(x, b, a) := f(x, a, b), (x, a, b) ∈ K. (B.5)
Remark B.1. According to Lemma A.4, the function fA↔B : Gr(ΦA↔B
B
) ⊂ (X×B)×A 7→ R defined in (B.5),
where ΦA↔B
B
is defined in (B.4), is K-inf-compact on Gr(ΦA↔B
B
) if and only if the following two conditions
hold:
(i) the function f : Gr(ΦB) ⊂ X× A× B 7→ R is lower semi-continuous;
(ii) if a sequence {x(n), b(n)}n=1,2,... with values in Gr(ΦB) converges and its limit (x, b) belongs to
Gr(ΦB), then each sequence {a
(n)}n=1,2,... with (x
(n), a(n), b(n)) ∈ K, n = 1, 2, . . . , satisfying the
condition that the sequence {f(x(n), a(n), b(n))}n=1,2,... is bounded above, has a limit point a ∈ ΦA(x).
The following theorem describes sufficient conditions for lower semi-continuity of the minimax function
v
♯ defined in (B.2) and basic properties for the solution multifunction Φ∗
A
defined in (B.3), when the image
sets {ΦA(x)}x∈X and {ΦB(x)}x∈X can be noncompact.
Theorem B.2. (cf. Feinberg et al. [10, Theorem 8 and Lemma 7(b)]) Let ΦB : X 7→ S(B) be a lower semi-
continuous set-valued mapping and the function fA↔B : Gr(ΦA↔B
B
) ⊂ (X × B) × A 7→ R defined in (B.5),
where ΦA↔B
B
is defined in (B.4), be K-inf-compact on Gr(ΦA↔B
B
). Then the minimax function v♯ : X 7→ R
defined in (B.2) is lower semi-continuous. Moreover, the infimum in (B.2) can be replaced with the minimum
and the nonempty sets {Φ∗
A
(x)}x∈X defined in (B.3) satisfy the following properties:
(a) the graph Gr(Φ∗
A
) is a Borel subset of X× A;
(b) if v♯(x) = +∞, then Φ∗
A
(x) = ΦA(x), and, if v
♯(x) < +∞, then Φ∗
A
(x) is compact.
Proof. Feinberg et al. [10, Lemma 7(b)] implies that the set-valued mapping ΦB : X 7→ S(B) is A-lower
semi-continuous (see Feinberg et al. [10, Definition 4]). Then all statements of Theorem B.2 follow from
Feinberg et al. [10, Theorem 8].
The following theorem describes sufficient conditions for K-upper semi-compactness of the solution
multifunction Φ∗
A
defined in (B.3), when the image sets {ΦA(x)}x∈X and {ΦB(x)}x∈X can be noncompact.
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TTheorem B.3. (cf. Feinberg et al. [10, Theorem 11 and Lemma 7(b)]) Let v♯ : X 7→ R ∪ {−∞} definedin (B.2) be a continuous function, ΦB : X 7→ S(B) be a lower semi-continuous set-valued mapping, andthe function fA↔B : Gr(ΦA↔BB ) ⊂ (X × B) × A 7→ R defined in (B.5), where ΦA↔BB is defined in (B.4), beK-inf-compact on Gr(ΦA↔BB ). Then the infimum in (B.2) can be replaced with the minimum and the solutionmultifunction Φ∗A : X 7→ S(A) defined in (B.3) is upper semi-continuous and compact-valued.Proof. Feinberg et al. [10, Lemma 7(b)] implies that the set-valued mapping ΦB : X 7→ S(B) is A-lowersemi-continuous; see Feinberg et al. [10, Definition 4]. Then all statements of Theorem B.3 follow fromFeinberg et al. [10, Theorem 11].
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